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As Good as it Gets? Security, Asylum, and the Rule of Law after the Certificate Trilogy  
 
Introduction 
Few elements of Canada’s national security apparatus have received as much legal, 
popular, or scholarly attention as security certificates.1 Although in existence since 1978, they 
have become a symbol of the heavy human rights costs associated with contemporary counter-
terrorism law, policy and practices. The reasons are easy to understand. Certificates are based 
largely on secret evidence, allow for the indefinite detention of non-citizens who are alleged to 
pose a threat to the security of Canada, pave the way for the removal of persons to face the 
substantial risk of persecution, torture, or similar abuses, and are arguably discriminatory on the 
basis of citizenship.2 The certificate regime also rests on a broader assemblage of security-based 
policies and practices associated with several high profile human rights abuses, including those 
perpetrated against Maher Arar, Abdullah Almalki, and Ahmad El Maati. 
Certificates have for these reasons been described as “exceptional”.3 A contested term, 
exceptionality may be defined simply as that which is rarely or infrequently used. This is a 
misleading definition; while certificates per se are infrequently used, security-based detentions 
and deportations have since the early 1990’s occurred rather regularly through more ordinary 
measures, while the use of secret evidence in the context of these and related practices is 
commonplace.4	  Indeed, successive governments have steadily “securitized” the entire 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
1  For a small sampling of literature, see: Colleen Bell, “Subject to Exception: Security Certificates, National 
Security and Canada’s Role in the ‘War on Terror’” (2006) 21:1 CJLS 63; Canadian Bar Association, Submission on 
Bill C-3 Immigration and Refugee Protection Act Amendments (Certificate and Special Advocates, 2007); 
Information in Immigration Proceedings Prior to the Introduction of the Current Legislation Canadian Council for 
Refugees, Security Certificates: Next Steps (2007) Ottawa, Canada, online: 
http://ccrweb.ca/documents/Certificates07.pdf; Craig Forcese & Lorne Waldman, “Seeking Justice in an Unfair 
Process: Lessons from Canada, the United Kingdom, and New Zealand on the Use of 'Special Advocates' in 
National Security Proceedings” (2007) University of Ottawa, Faculty of Law (online: 
http://aix1.uottawa.ca/~cforcese/other/sastudy.pdf); Human Rights Watch, “Canada: Parliament Should Amend Bill 
on Special Advocates” (19 November 2007) online: http://www.hrw.org/fr/news/2007/11/18/canada-parliament-
should-amend-bill-special-advocates; John Ip, “The Rise and Spread of the Special Advocate” (2008) PL at 717-
741; International Civil Liberties Monitoring Group, “Submission of Information by the ICLMG to the Committee 
Against Torture (CAT) for the Examination of Canada’s 6th Report in May 2012” (2012) Montreal, Canada (online: 
http://www.justiceforhassandiab.org/wp-content/uploads/2012/12/allmandiclmg160412.pdf); David Jenkins, “There 
and Back Again: The Strange Journey of Special Advocates and Comparative Law Methodology” (2011) 42:2 
Colum HRL Rev 279; Kent Roach, “When Secret Intelligence Becomes Evidence: Some Implications of Khadr and 
Charkaoui II” (2009) 47 Sup Ct L Rev 147. 
2 Similar provisions were A and others v Secretary of State for the Home Department, [2004] UKHL 56.  
3 Bell, supra note 1; Colleen Bell, The Freedom of Security: Governing Canada in the Age of Counter-Terrorism in 
particular, chapter 2, “The Socio-Legal Paradox of Freedom: security certificates and the politics of exception” 
(UBC Press, 2011) 55; Irina Ceric, “The Sovereign Charter: Security, Territory and the Boundaries of Constitutional 
Rights” (2012) 44:1 Ottawa L Rev 1; Mike Larsen and Justin Piche, “Incarcerating the ‘inadmissible’: KIHC as an 
Exceptional Moment in Canadian Federal Imprisonment” (2007) 45 YCISS 1; Kent roach, “The Law Working Itself 
Pure? The Canadian Experience with Exceptional Courts and Guantánamo” in Fionnuala Ni Aoláin & Oren Gross, 
eds, Guantánamo and Beyond: Exceptional Courts and Military Commissions in Comparative Perspective 
(Cambridge University Press, 2013) 201. 
4 These measures include admissibility hearings, refugee claim hearings, detention reviews, as well as a host of 
supplemental preventive and deterrent measures that include revocation of passports and the removal of the 
citizenship of so-called “foreign fighters” (when such fighters have dual citizenship). I will outline the similarities 
between these proceedings and certificates in Part IV of this paper. In the meantime, see: Jo Anne Colson, 
“Canadian refugee policy: The politics of the frame” (2013) Ph.D. Thesis, Trent University, Peterborough, pp. 132-
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immigration and refugee law system, employing such practices as: enhanced surveillance and 
screening of migrants,5 arbitrary detentions, expedited removals, limitations on the procedural 
and substantive rights of asylum seekers, and greater information-sharing/institutional co-
operation at the domestic and international levels.6 In combination with recent legislative 
reforms,7 these practices support a range of adjudicative and discretionary decision-making 
processes that operate outside of the context of certificates.8 
 We may instead adopt a constitutional definition of the exceptionality, which refers to 
measures and practices that do not (self-evidently) cohere with constitutional principles or 
autonomous legal values, such as the rule of law.9The difficulty with this understanding of 
exceptionality is that reasonable people can disagree about what the law allows. In three recent 
cases -- Charkaoui I,10 Charkaoui II,11 and Harkat v. Canada12-- the Supreme Court decided that 
the pernicious qualities of certificates are more or less manageable, so long as courts, parliament, 
and other legal actors are vigilant in operationalizing core constitutional principles. In Charkaoui 
I  and Charkaoui II, the Court decided that elements of the certificate regime were 
unconstitutional, but could be saved if parliament addressed deficiencies in disclosure and 
adversarial challenge. In Harkat v. Canada, the Court reviewed parliament’s response to the 
Charkaoui judgments, finding that the current regime passes constitutional muster. It also upheld 
the reasonableness of the certificate issued against Mr. Harkat, paving the way for his removal 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
140; Philippe Bourbeau, The Securitization of Migration: A Study of Movement and Order (New York: Routledge, 
2011) at 20; Sharryn J. Aiken, “National Security and Canadian Immigration: Deconstructing the Discourse of 
Trade-Offs” in Francois Crépeau, eds, Les Migrations Internationals Contemporaines: Une Dynamique Complexe 
au Coeur de la Globalization (Presses de L’Université de Montréal, 2009) at 172-199; Sharryn J. Aiken, “Of Gods 
and Monsters: National Security and Canadian Refugee Policy,” (2002) Revue Québécoise de droit international 
14:1 at 19. 
5 Deborah Waller Meyers, “Does “Smarter” Lead to Safer? An Assessment of the US Border Accords with Canada 
and Mexico” (2003) 41(4) IM 5; Richard Friman, “Migration and Security. Crime, Terror and the Politics of Order” 
in Ariane Chebel d’Appollonia & Simon Reich, eds, Immigration, Integration and Security. America and Europe in 
Comparative Perspective (Pittsburgh: University of Pittsburgh Press, 2008) 130-144. 
6 Graham Hudson, Transnational Human Rights Advocacy and the Judicial Review of Global Intelligence Agency 
Cooperation in Canada” in Craig Forcese & François Crépeau, eds., Terrorism, Law and Democracy: Ten Years 
After 9/11 (Canadian Institute for the Administration of Justice, 2011); Canada-US Beyond the Border 2011; 
Government of Canada, Border Action Plan, Alexander Moens, “The Challenging Parameters of the Border Action 
Plan” in Perimeter Security and the Beyond the Border Dialogue, Special report, Border Policy Research Institute 
(Western Washington University, 2011) 15-21 
7 Protecting Canada’s Immigration System Act, SC  2012, C. 17; Balanced Refugee Reform Act, S.C. 2010, c. 8. 
8 Examples include admissibility hearings, detention reviews, and decisions to deport in the context of persecution, 
torture, extra-judicial killings, and similar human rights abuses. I will provide a more detailed description of these 
various decision-making processes in Part IV of the paper. 
 
9 Giorgio Agamben, State of Exception (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 2005); David Dyzenhaus, “The State 
of Emergency in Legal Theory” in Victor V. Ramraj, Michael Hor & Kent Roach, eds, Global Anti-Terrorism Law 
and Policy (Cambridge; New York: Cambridge University Press, 2005) 65; Oren Gross, “Chaos and Rules: Should 
Responses to Violent Crises Always be Constitutional?” (2003) 112 Yale LJ 1011; John Ferejohn & Pasquale 
Pasquino, “The Law of Exception: A Typology of Emergency Powers” (2004) 2 International Journal of 
Constitutional Law 210; Colin McQuillan, “The Real State of Emergency: Agamben on Benjamin and Schmitt” 
(2011); Walter Benjamin, “On the Concept of History” [trans. H. Zohn] in H.Eiland & M. W. Jennings , eds, Walter 
Benjamin: Selected Writings, Volume  4: 1938-1940 (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 2003a). 
10 Charkaoui v Canada (Citizenship and Immigration), 2007 SCC 9, [2007] 1 SCR 350.  
11 Charkaoui v Canada (Citizenship and Immigration), 2008 SCC 38, [2008] 2 SCR 326. 
12 R v Harkat, 2014 SCC 37, [2014] SCR. 
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from Canada.13 Mr. Harkat is the first of five alleged terrorists named in certificates since 9/11 to 
be subject to removal.  
The immanence of Mr. Harkat’s removal highlights a third, doctrinal definition of 
exceptionality. In the 2002 case of Suresh v. Canada, the Supreme Court ruled that Canada is 
generally prohibited from deporting persons to face the substantial risk of torture. Derogating 
from our international obligations, it went on to say that deportation to torture may be justified 
under “exceptional circumstances”.14 The Court did not clarify what counts as an exceptional 
circumstance. Given that Mr. Harkat claims that he would be subject to torture or similar abuse if 
returned to Algeria,15the precise ambits (and legality) of this zone of exceptionality is critical. 
Amidst revelations concerning Canada’s complicity in torture as well as extensive normative 
developments, 16 the Court may soon have occasion to revisit Suresh, much as it did with respect 
to extradition to face the death penalty.17 
The purpose of this paper is to use constitutional discourses on the legality of security 
certificates to shed light on darker, neglected corners of the security/migration nexus, with 
special regard to deportation to torture. I will argue that the certificate trilogy and Suresh rest on 
the same, cardinal principle: decisions that expose asylum seekers to (the substantial risk of) 
serious human rights abuses must be constrained by enhanced procedural protections, such as 
disclosure, adversarial challenge, and judicial review. On the one hand, courts have internalized 
this principle in the context of certificates and functionally equivalent proceedings, which is to 
say they have imposed meaningful (albeit imperfect) constraints on the ability of the executive to 
label persons security risks. On the other hand, the ability of decision-makers to subsequently 
deport security risks to face torture or similar abuses remains effectively unconstrained -- so 
much so, it is doubtful that Canada has complied with Suresh. If the Supreme Court takes its own 
rationale in the certificate trilogy seriously, it must either revise its position in Suresh, or, 
encourage the extension of the procedures and practices used in the certificate regime to the 
entire security/migration nexus, including the removal process.  
The paper is divided into four parts. First, I will review the shifting legislative and 
constitutional landscape within which certificates operate, highlighting core principles elucidated 
in Charkaoui I and II. This will include reference to recent legislative changes ushered in by Bill 
C-51 (hereafter the “Anti-Terrorism Act, 2015”). Second, I will use Harkat as a base for 
appraising how parliament and the Federal Court have attempted to operationalize the 
constitutional principles outlined in Charkaoui I and II. I will focus in particular on how the 
Supreme Court has placed the bulk of responsibility for guarding the rule of law on the shoulders 
of Federal Court judges. I will argue that its trust in the Federal Court’s ability (and willingness) 
to discharge this role is the primary condition under which it tolerates legislative language and 
executive practices that continue to provide for the possibility of grave injustice and human 
rights abuses. Fourth, I will reflect on how the position of the Court in the certificate trilogy 
obligates it to take notice of non-compliance with Suresh. I will argue that certain procedural 
protections used in the certificate regime therein should be used to improve the quality and 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
13 Harkat (Re), 2010 FC 1241, [2012] 3 FCR 251. 
14 Suresh v Canada (Minister of Citizenship and Immigration), 2002 SCC 1, [2002] 1 SCR 3 at para. 78. 
15 Sean Kilpatrick, “Mohamed Harkat says he'll need a casket if deported to Algeria”, The Canadian Press (15 May 
2014) online CTV News: <http://www.ctvnews.ca> 
16 I will detail these factual and normative developments below. 
17 United States v Burns, 2001 SC 7, [2001] 1 SCR 283. 
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fairness of decision-making about the deportation of security risks in contexts where there exists 
a substantial risk of torture and similar abuse. 
  
I. The Constitution of Security Certificates  
A. Legislative Framework 
In existence since 1978, security certificates are a long-standing component of 
immigration and refugee law. Governed under Division 9 of the Immigration and Refugee 
Protection Act (IRPA),18 certificate proceedings begin when the Ministers of Public Safety 
Canada and Citizenship and Immigration Canada issue a certificate against a non-citizen who 
they allege is inadmissible to Canada on the grounds of security, violation of human or 
international rights, serious criminality and organized criminality.19 The bulk of evidence used to 
support this allegation is provided by the Canadian Security Intelligence Service (CSIS), 
although the Ministers may also rely on information provided by the Canadian Border Services 
Agency (CBSA), the Royal Canadian Mounted Police (RCMP), and Communications Security 
Establishment Canada (CSE). Evidence consists in human source intelligence (e.g. informants, 
espionage), signals intelligence (intercepted communications), foreign intelligence, and “open 
sources”. This information and intelligence is collected through domestic operations, as well as 
through formal and informal partnerships with foreign intelligence and law-enforcement 
agencies.20    
Once the Minsters believe they have reasonable grounds to suspect that a non-citizen 
poses a security risk, they will issue a certificate and a warrant for the arrest of the named person. 
A Federal Court judge (hereafter the “designated judge”) will review the reasons for the 
detention and the reasonableness of the certificate itself. The judge must order the continuation 
of the detention if the release of the named person would be injurious to national security, 
endanger the safety of any person, or enhance the risk of flight. Detention reviews occur within 
the first 48 hours after a detention begins and at six months intervals thereafter, (at least) until the 
reasonableness of the certificate has been determined. 21 
Until recently, the IRPA required the Minsters to provide the designated judge with all 
relevant information and other evidence upon which the certificate is based.22 As part of the suite 
of amendments introduced through the some-to-be-enacted Anti-Terrorism Act, 2015, the scope 
of this disclosure will be reduced to evidence that is “relevant to the ground of inadmissibility 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
18 Immigration and Refugee Protection Act, SC 2001 
19 Ibid at s 77(1). 
20 For an overview of how security intelligence is gathered and shared, see: Graham Hudson, “Transnational Human 
Rights Advocacy and the Judicial Review of Global Intelligence Agency Cooperation in Canada” in Craig Forcese 
& François Crépeau, eds., Terrorism, Law and Democracy: Ten Years After 9/11 (Canadian Institute for the 
Administration of Justice, 2011); Adam D. Svendsen, “Connecting Intelligence and Theory: Intelligence Liaison and 
International Relations” (2009) 24:5 Intelligence and National Security 700; Martin Rudner, “Hunters and 
Gatherers: The Intelligence Coalition Against Islamic Terrorism” (2004) 17:2 International Journal of Intelligence 
and Counterintelligence 193; Glen M. Segell, “Intelligence Agency Relations Between the European Union and the 
U.S.” (2004) 17:1 International Journal of Intelligence and Counterintelligence 81; Stéphane Lefebvre, “The 
Difficulties and Dilemmas of International Intelligence Cooperation” (2003) 16:4 International Journal of 
Intelligence and Counterintelligence 527; D.S. Reveron, “Old Allies, New Friends: Intelligence-Sharing in the War 
on Terror” (2006) 50:3 Orbis 453; 2001) The Journal of Conflict Studies 7; Richard J. Aldrich, “Beyond the Vigilant 
State: Globalisation and Intelligence” (2009) 35 (4) 889-902. 
 
21 IRPA, supra note 18 at s 82. 
22 Ibid at s 77(2). 
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stated in the certificate”.23 The Ministers must then prove, on a balance of probabilities, that they 
had reasonable grounds to issue the certificate. If the designated judge finds that a certificate is 
reasonable, the person is inadmissible and subject to removal from Canada. The designated judge 
is authorized to make decisions on the basis of evidence not disclosed to the named person.  
Provisions in Division 9 of IRPA govern the general framework for proceedings. Section 
83 specifies the procedures by which information is to be protected, directing designated judges 
to: proceed as informally and expeditiously as the circumstances and considerations of fairness 
and natural justice permit; to receive into evidence, and base a decision on, anything that s/he 
considered to be reliable and appropriate, even if it is inadmissible in a court of law; and to 
ensure the confidentiality of information and other evidence provided by the Minister if, in the 
judge’s opinion, its disclosure would be injurious to national security or endanger the safety of 
any person. At the initiative of the Minsters, the latter determination is made during the course of 
a closed hearing.  
According to the IRPA, named persons are entitled to the disclosure of such evidence as 
is necessary to be “reasonably informed” of the case against him.24 Disclosed evidence comes in 
the form of a Public Security Intelligence Report (PSIR), “source matrices”, and summaries of 
closed evidence prepared by the Minister.25 Named person and his counsel are allowed to call 
and to cross-examine Minster’s witnesses who testify during open hearings. The Immigration 
and Refugee Protection Act (IRPA) directs designated judges to maintain the confidentiality of 
information the disclosure of which would adversely affect national security (including the 
integrity of national security operations, strategies and relationships) or the safety of individual 
persons e.g. intelligence officers and operatives, human sources. Closed hearings are attended at 
by the judge, Minsters, “special advocates” (SAs), and a court worker. Each of these parties has 
access to Secret Security Intelligence Reports (SSIR), which include the history, results, and 
progress of ongoing or stalled intelligence operations. 
 Due to the ATA, 2015, not all of this information will be filed with the Federal Court; 
only such information that is relevant to the ground of admissibility outlined in the certificate 
will be filed. Special Advocates may request the disclosure of information in the possession of 
the government but that has not been filed. This enables SAs to access exculpatory evidence, 
challenge the reliability of submitted evidence or the reasonableness of the government’s 
position, or identify whether evidence may have been derived from torture. The ATA, 2015 
allows the Ministers to challenge further disclosure on the grounds that requested information 
does not enable the named person to be reasonably informed of the case against him. This 
supposes, wrongly, that the right to be reasonably informed suffices to enable named persons to 
adequately defend themselves. As we will see when we review Harkat, the adequacy of the SA 
regime is a separate matter from the right of named persons to be reasonably informed- - both are 
necessary for a trial to be fair.  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
23  
24 IRPA, supra note 14 at s 83. 
25 Since 2005, the Federal Court has required that source matrices include information that places intelligence in 
context, including: the origin and the length of the relationship between CSIS and a human source or foreign 
intelligence service; whether there are reasons to believe the information or intelligence was provided for self-gain; 
whether a human source has a prior criminal record or under investigation by a law-enforcement or security 
intelligence agency; the extent to which information or intelligence has been, or is, corroborated by other evidence 
or information; and, whether the information or intelligence was acquired through torture or grave human rights 
abuse; and the accuracy of any document that records or summarizes intercepted information; see Harkat (Re), 2005 
FC 393, [2006] 1 FCR D-5 at paras 94-96. 
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B. Charkaoui I 
Prior to Harkat, the Supreme Court of Canada twice reviewed elements of the certificate 
regime for consistency with the Charter.26 In Charkaoui I, it invalidated certain provisions in 
IRPA governing the protection of information. A primary issue was the constitutionality of the 
use of closed evidence. At the time, the impugned provisions required that such evidence be 
tendered during closed hearings attended at only by the designated judge and the Minsters – 
there were no SAs. The court found that the absence of counsel representing the interests of 
named persons during closed proceedings contravened the s. 7 Charter right to a fair trial. 
Importantly, this decision rested on its observation that certificates lead to three actual or 
potential substantive harms: protracted detention, deportation to torture, and harm to dignity.27  
The cardinal principle in Charkaoui I – and the certificate trilogy as a whole— is that 
proceedings that lead to (the risk) of serious deprivations of life, liberty, or security of the person 
requires enhanced procedural protections. It does not matter whether the proceedings are 
criminal or administrative in nature; what matters is the impact the decision has on the well-
being of the affected person. While certificate proceedings are administrative in nature, the Court 
accordingly relied on criminal law principles to resolve the question of whether named persons 
were receiving a fair trial, which consists of three conditions. First, the named person must know 
and be able to respond to the Minster’s allegations. This requires that the named person receive a 
certain, unspecified amount of direct disclosure. Second, the designated judge must base her 
decision made on the basis of the facts and law. This condition could be satisfied by the presence 
of opposing counsel during secret trials (i.e. adversarial challenge), who may challenge the 
reliability and sufficiency of secret evidence as well as the strength of the Minister’s arguments. 
Third, the designated judge must be independent and impartial.28  
The Court ruled that the first two conditions were sorely lacking. The Court gave the 
government an opportunity to save the certificate regime by pointing to several alternative 
approaches to using secret evidence. Prior to the introduction of the IRPA, for example, the 
reasonableness of certificates was reviewed by the Security Intelligence Review Committee 
(SIRC) – an independent body tasked with the review of CSIS activities.29 SIRC was assisted by 
security-cleared counsels who, among other things, advanced the interests of a complainant. 
While not an advocate per se, SIRC counsel had access to closed evidence and could cross-
examine government witnesses during closed hearings. Similar approaches were used during the 
Arar Inquiry.30 The Court also took notice of the fact that the United Kingdom has employed a 
SIRC-style SA model since 1997.31 Notwithstanding some notable weaknesses, including under-
resourcing of SAs and statutory bars to communication between SAs and affected persons, this 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
26 It upheld the constitutionality of pre-9/11 certificate legislation in Canada (Minister of Employment and 
Immigration) v Chiarelli, [1992] 1 SCR 711. 
27 Charkaoui I, supra note 10 at paras 12-18. The court did not use the term “dignity” directly. It stated that a 
“certificate may bring with it the accusation that one is a terrorist, which could cause irreparable harm to the 
individual”, adding later that this includes – and thus is not limited to-- deportation to torture.;. The Court was aware 
of the 2004 judgment of UK House of Lords that similar provisions in the UK were discriminatory within the 
meaning of Article 14 of the European Conventions on Fundamental Freedoms and Human Rights; A and Others, 
supra note 2. 
28 Charkaoui I, supra note 10 at paras 28-31 
29 Murray Rankin, “The Security Intelligence Review Committee: Reconciling National Security with Procedural 
Fairness” (1990) 3 CJALP 173. 
30 Hudson, supra note 6 at 33. 
31 Charkaoui I, supra note 10 at paras 80-84. 
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system was certainly superior to the IRPA system then under review. The Court left it for 
parliament to decide how to bring the certificate regime into conformity with the Charter. 
 Parliament shortly thereafter amended the IRPA, empowering SAs to attend at closed 
hearings in order to a) challenge the Ministers’ claims that certain information cannot be 
disclosed for reasons of national security or personal safety, and b) challenge the relevance, 
reliability and sufficiency of secret evidence. Section 85.2 of IRPA specifies that SAs may make 
oral and written communication with respect to classified information. SAs may also participate 
in, and cross-examine witnesses who testify during closed hearings.  
Designated judges have been required to interpret and apply these provisions in 
consideration of Charkaoui I. Over time, a series of questions has recurred, including: may SAs 
access all information on file with the government that is relevant to a named person, or, can 
they only access evidence submitted by the Ministers? Under what circumstances might 
procedural fairness justify the disclosure of privileged material, such as the employment records 
of CSIS agents or the identities of confidential informants?32 May SAs cross-examine CSIS 
human sources –whose identities would normally be kept confidential-- in order to challenge the 
reliability of evidence? To what extent may SAs communicate with named persons, or other 
SAs, about a case after having seen classified material? To what extent are communications 
between SAs and named persons covered by solicitor-client privilege? Finally, do named persons 
have a right to direct disclosure, regardless of what is disclosed to SAs? 
Foreseeing some of these issues, parliament provided designated judges with broad 
discretion over procedural matters relating to SAs. For instance, s. 85.6 authorizes the Chief 
Justices of the Federal Court of Appeal and the Federal Court, along with a committee of their 
choosing, to make rules governing the practices and procedures relating to SAs. Designated 
judges, of which there are typically between 8-10, receive training in handling secret evidence 
and presiding over secret trials, and regularly confer with one another about lessons learned and 
best practices. Section 85.2(c) directs designated judges to authorize “any other powers that are 
necessary to protect the interests of the permanent resident or foreign nationals”. Section 85.5 
allows judges to waive prohibitions on communication between SAs and named persons. Finally, 
parliament provided named persons with a right of appeal to the Federal Court of Appeal for 
serious questions of general importance, excluding interlocutory decisions.33 These legislative 
provisions and the institutional culture of the Federal Court have helped ensure consistent 
practice among designated judges. 
 
C. Charkaoui II 
Shortly following the 2008 amendment of IRPA, the Court turned its attention to the 
outer limits of the certificate regime: the assemblage of security intelligence practices that 
produce evidence used against named persons. In Charkaoui II, the Court again analogized the 
certificate regime with criminal proceedings, this time noting that functional distinctions between 
security intelligence and law-enforcement have blurred post-9/11, and, that certificate-based 
deportations can lead to arrest and prosecution abroad.34 The Court decided that CSIS, and any 
other domestic institution providing the Minsters with security intelligence and other 
information, is subject to criminal law principles relating to the retention and disclosure of 
evidence. Operationally, this means that CSIS must retain and disclose to the Ministers all 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
32 Harkat (Re), 2009 FC 203, [2009] 339 FTR 60 
33 IRPA, supra note 18 at s 82(3). 
34 Charkaoui II, supra note 11 at paras 26-28, 50-55. 
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information on file that is “relevant” to a named person, whether it is inculpatory or exculpatory. 
The Ministers, in turn, are responsible for ensuring that all of this information is disclosed to the 
designated judge and SAs. In consideration of the position of the Minster and SAs, the judge 
then determines what material may be disclosed to the named person and what material must 
remain classified.  
Charkaoui II provided considerable guidance to designated judges with respect to 
questions of disclosure, but some old questions remained and new questions quickly emerged, 
including: what is the exact scope of CSIS’ obligation to disclose? Must it disclose all 
information that is minimally relevant or only information that is reasonably necessary in order 
for the SAs to test the accuracy of submitted evidence?35 Does Charkaoui II disclosure include 
information that may be privileged, such as the identities of human sources? If CSIS’ 
confidential informants do enjoy privilege, under what conditions (if any) may it be lifted? If 
there is no privilege, or if it is lifted, should SAs also be able to cross-examine human sources? 
How might Charkaoui II affect the fairness of proceedings that were already underway, given 
that large volumes of information that should have been disclosed in principle were already 
destroyed in accordance with long-standing internal policy? Finally, courts still had not 
addressed whether named persons are entitled to receive a certain amount of direct disclosure. As 
adequate as the SA system may be, it does not completely satisfy the free-standing, s. 7 right of a 
named person to know and respond to the case against him.  
 
D. Summary 
In sum, Parliament’s intent that certificate proceedings be carried out “as informally and 
expeditiously as possible” has not been realized. To the contrary, they have proven to be 
exceedingly complex, time-consuming, and administratively burdensome. The internal 
operations of public and closed proceedings, and within which stream certain information 
appropriately belongs, have been subject to frequent interlocutory hearings, appeals, and Charter 
challenges. Charter challenges have in two instances yielded landmark Supreme Court rulings, 
but there remained a plethora of questions about how the Federal Court was to operationalize 
abstract principles. Parliament’s decision to allow the Federal Court and Federal Court of Appeal 
to produce rules, and to resolve questions, of procedure has facilitated as measure of consistency. 
Designated judges frequently confer, receive direction from the Chief Justice of the Federal 
Court (and of Appeal), and regularly cite each other’s decisions. Consistency is also supported 
by the availability of appeals on questions of law, both to the Federal Court of Appeal and the 
Supreme Court. Still, the usual operations and institutional capacities of the Federal Court have 
been strained by the need for judges to manage large volumes of factual information across 
public and closed hearings, while building and maintaining a body of jurisprudence in the 
context of a shifting constitutional and legislative landscape.   
 
 
II. Harkat v. Canada: 
 
Harkat v. Canada is the most recent Supreme Court of Canada case on the constitutionality 
of the certificate regime. The case was triggered by a 2010 finding by designated judge Noel J. 
that the certificate issued against Mr. Harkat was reasonable.36 Facing removal, Mr. Harkat’s 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
35 Harkat, supra note 27 at para 12. 
36 Harkat, supra note 12 at paras 107-109. 
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only chance of having the certificate against him quashed was to persuade the Supreme Court 
that the post-Charkaoui I legislative framework for certificates remained unconstitutional, or, 
that the proceedings against him were conducted in an unfair manner.  
 
A. A Second Look at Certificate Legislation 
 
The first set of issues concerned whether parliament fully incorporated the elements of a 
fair trial into Division 9 of the IRPA. There were host sub-issues at play here, including: a) 
whether named persons receive enough information to be reasonably informed of the case 
against them, b) whether Special Advocates possess the powers and resources necessary to 
discharge their roles, c) whether the Charter allows for hearsay to be used as evidence.  
As noted, the Court in Charkaoui I stated that a fair trial consists in three distinct but 
interrelated elements: the right to know and to respond to the Minster’s allegations, the right to 
have decisions made on the basis of the facts and law, and the right to have decisions made by an 
independent and impartial adjudicator. The Court found that a certificate proceeding will always 
be unfair if a) the named person is only provided access to general assertions (i.e. the right to 
know/respond to the case is violated), and b) if there is an absence of adversarial challenge (i.e. a 
decision is not [reliably] based on the facts and law). As we saw, the Court dealt with these 
issues by recommending the introduction of a SA system. But the Court did not squarely address 
the question of whether the s. 7 right of named persons to know and meet the case against them 
requires a certain degree of direct disclosure, regardless of what may be disclosed to a SA.  
There are some analogs for determining the scope of direct disclosure. In a criminal trial, 
for example, an accused is entitled to receive any and all information in the possession of the 
Crown that is relevant to his/her defence and that is not subject to a limited class of privilege. 
The accused is always entitled to information that is submitted as evidence. Even here, there may 
be conflicts between disclosure and national security. These conflicts are governed by s. 38 of 
the Canada Evidence Act (CEA).37 This provision authorizes judges to order the disclosure of 
sensitive information if the public interest in doing so outweighs the public interest in non-
disclosure. 38 When this happens in the context of a criminal trial, the Crown may respond by 
withdrawing the contested information as evidence. This means that information that is not 
disclosed to an accused may not, under any circumstances, be submitted as evidence in a 
criminal trial. In the event that the non-disclosure of evidence unduly limits the capacity of the 
accused to make full answer and defence, a judge may provide certain remedies, including 
staying proceedings. 
The Court has consistently found that this model is inappropriate for certificates. 39 This 
is because requiring that evidence either be disclosed to a named person or withdrawn 
undermines the entire purpose of the certificate regime. While the Court has been applying 
criminal law principles to certificate proceedings, it was reluctant to find that the use of secret 
evidence during administrative proceedings is per se unconstitutional.  The real question was the 
extent of direct disclosure required or, put negatively, the extent of submitted evidence that may 
be constitutionally withheld from the named person. The Court decided that named persons are 
entitled to receive what it called an “incompressible minimum amount of disclosure”; in the 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
37 Canada Evidence Act, RSC 1985, c C-5 
38 Harkat, supra note 12 at para 69. 
39 Ibid at para 50; Charkaoui I, supra note 10 at para 77. 
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absence of this minimum core, proceedings will be deemed unfair.40 Designated judges were 
directed to determine whether there has been a sufficient degree of direct disclosure on a case-
by-case basis. In the event that a judge directs disclosure of material the Minister resolutely 
wishes to keep classified, “the Minister must withdraw the information or evidence whose non-
disclosure prevents the named person from being reasonably informed.”41 Incidentally, the ATA, 
2015 provides the Minister with the exclusive right to appeal decisions on disclosure – an act 
which suspends the disclosure order until the matter has been settled by the Federal Court of 
Appeal. 
The Court then addressed the tendency of the government to over-claim national security 
confidentiality. This issue has been a subject of judicial concern, both within the context of 
security certificates42 and beyond.43 It should be noted that over-claiming of confidentiality is 
often not driven by disregard for the Charter; it is more frequently a function of novel and 
complex relationships between government lawyers and members of the intelligence community, 
and an understandable concern on the part of the former to err on the side of over-claiming than 
divulging highly sensitive information. Nonetheless, the Court took occasion to direct designated 
judges to “be vigilant and skeptical with respect to the Minister’s claims of confidentiality.”44 
Recognizing the exceptional nature of security certificates and its place at the outer limits of 
constitutionality, it concluded by stating that over-claiming threatens the integrity of the 
certificate regime’s “fragile equilibrium”, and that “systematic over-claiming would infringe the 
named person’s right to a fair process or undermine the integrity of the judicial system, requiring 
a remedy under s. 24(1) of the Charter.”45  
With these issues out of the way, the Court turned its attention to the adequacy of the SA 
system. As noted, SAs are prohibited from communicating with named persons after accessing 
classified material. This provision impedes effective advocacy, as communication helps SAs: 
receive meaningful instruction and information from affected persons, use knowledge about 
personal history and relationships to challenge the reliability or sufficiency of circumstantial 
evidence, prepare the named person for (cross-examination), and more effectively cross-examine 
the Ministers’ witnesses.46 In addition to improving legal representation, the freer, two-way flow 
of information between SAs and named persons (and their counsel) would concomitantly 
improve the ability of designated judges to decide on the basis of law and the facts.  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
40 Harkat, supra note 12 at para 55; this aspect of the judgment was informed by the 2009 case of  Secretary of State 
for the Home Department v. A and Others, decided by the European Court of Human Rights.The ECtHR decided 
that a trial would be unfair if disclosed material consists “purely” of general assertions, and where a decision is 
“based solely or to a decisive degree on closed material”. para 220; see also Secretary of State for the Home 
Department v. A.F. (No. 3), [2009] UKHL 28, [2009] 3 All ER 643, at para 59; Secretary of State v. M.B., [2007] 
UKHL 46 [“SSHD v. MB”]; A. and Others v. the United Kingdom, Application 3455-05, and ECHR Feb.19, 2009; 
Secretary of State for the Home Department v. AF and Others, [2009] UKHL 28 [“SSHD v. AF”] 
41 Just such a scenario occurred in Charkaoui (Re), 2009 FC 1030, [2010] 4 FCR 448, when Trembley-Lamer J. 
ordered the disclosure of evidence notwithstanding the Minster’s ardent position that this would result in injury to 
national security. The Minister chose to withdraw the evidence, which resulted in the quashing of the certificate 
against Mr. Charkaoui. 
42 Almrei (Re), 2009 FC 1263, [2011] 1 FCR 163. 
43 Canada (Attorney General) v. Almalki, 2010 FC 1106, [2012] 2 FCR 508 at para 108; Khadr v. Canada (Attorney 
General), (2008) FC 549, 329 FTR 80 at paras 73-77 and 98; Commission of Inquiry into the Actions of Canadian 
Officials in Relation to Maher Arar, Report of the Events Relating to Maher Arar: Analysis and Recommendations 
(2006) at 302. 
44 Harkat, supra note 12 at para 63. 
45 Ibid at para 64. 
46 Forcese & Waldman, supra note 1 at 35-38.   
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The constitutionality of the IRPA on this point was saved by s. 85.4(2), which authorizes 
designated judges to allow communication on a case-by-case basis. It turns out that designated 
judges have adopted the practice of authorizing communication “in most cases”.47 The Court 
explicitly directed designated judges to continue this practice and, what is more, to “take a liberal 
approach” to communication requests, refusing authorization only “where the Minister has 
demonstrated, on a balance of probabilities, a real — as opposed to a speculative — risk of 
injurious disclosure”.48 It also noted that SAs may receive an “unlimited amount of one-way 
communication” from named persons, the utility of which is enhanced by the provision of 
fulsome summaries and PSIR- a reality that will hopefully be safeguarded by the provision of a 
minimum core of disclosure.49 
A practical difficulty arises, though, as SAs may receive such permission only after 
submitting a formal request during interlocutory hearings attended at by the Ministers -- 
divulging prior communication and litigation strategies may obviously prejudice the named 
person and breach of solicitor-client privilege. In addition to being powerfully protected at 
common law and constitutional law,50 solicitor-client privilege is expressly protected under s. 
85.1(4) of the IRPA. The Court decided that this potential unfairness may be averted if 
designated judges employ safeguards, such as hearing the submissions of SAs in the absence of 
the Minsters.51  
A final issue related to hearsay. This is an issue of general importance because evidence 
derived from security intelligence work often contains appreciable levels of hearsay. Hearsay is 
ordinarily inadmissible as evidence in large part due to questions of reliability.52 It will be 
recalled that the IRPA allows designated judges to receive into evidence anything they consider 
to be reliable and appropriate, even if inadmissible in a court of law.53 The Court upheld the 
constitutionality of this provision on the grounds that the IRPA empowers designated judges to 
exclude evidence that s/he finds to be unreliable or that excessively prejudices a named person.54 
This allows judges to protect against unfairness while accommodating the realities of security 
intelligence work. 
   
 
B. Were Proceedings Against Mr. Harkat Fair? 
 
The next cluster of issues concerned whether proceedings against Mr. Harkat cohered 
with the principles outlined in Charkaoui II. This segment of the judgment dealt with the extents 
to which criminal law principles should govern certificate proceedings. For example, Mr. Harkat 
argued that his SAs should have the authority to cross-examine or at least learnt he identities of 
CSIS human sources. The government responded that these sources are protected by “informer 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
47 Harkat (Re), 2010 FC 1242, [2012] 3 FCR 432 at para 139. 
48 Harkat, supra note 12 at para 70. 
49 Ibid at para 71. 
50  Smith v Jones, [1999] 1 SCR 455; R v Hebert, [1990] 2 SCR 151; R v Jones, [1994] 2 SCR 229 at pp 246-55; Re 
Shell Canada Ltd., [1975] FC 184, 22 CCC (2d) 70 (CA); Solosky v The Queen, [1980] 1 SCR 821. 
51 Harkat, supra note 12 at para 72; Almrei (Re), 2008 FC 1216 [2009] 3 FCR 497 at paras 60-61. 
52 David M. Tanovich, “Starr Gazing: Looking into the Future of Hearsay in Canada” (2003) 28 Queen’s LJ 371. 
53 This allows for the admission of evidence if a judge is “satisfied that the information is reliable and appropriate”, 
even though” under traditional rules of evidence it would be inadmissible as hearsay”; Jaballah (Re), 2010 FC 224, 
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54 Harkat, supra note 12 at para 76. 
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privilege”, which is ordinarily used to withhold the identities of police informants. It is a cardinal 
rule in criminal law that the identities of police informants are privileged, meaning that they 
cannot be divulged to the defence or to the public.55 This obviously means that informers cannot 
be cross-examined. The rationale for informer privilege is twofold: to protect the informer and, 
in so doing, to encourage others to come forward with important information.56 The non-
disclosure of information pertaining to informers runs counter to the principle of full disclosure. 
However, informer privilege has acquired constitutional status, such that the identity of the 
informer will be divulged if and only if it is necessary to demonstrate the innocence of the 
accused.57  
When Harkat was before the Federal Court, Noel J. held that CSIS human sources are 
protected by privilege. Consistently with the logic of Charkaoui II, Noel J. reasoned that such 
sources are functionally equivalent to police informers and that utmost secrecy is essential to 
effective intelligence work.58 It is standard practice, for example, to “compartmentalize” 
information pertaining to the identities of human sources, such that only those who have a “need 
to know” such information in order to fulfill an operational requirement are provided with 
access.59 The injury that would result from not maintaining the confidentiality of informer 
identities would result in the breakdown of short- and long-term relationships that are among the 
primary means through which CSIS acquires intelligence and other information.60 Noel J. held 
that the only circumstance under which SAs would be granted access to such information would 
be to “prevent a flagrant breach of procedural justice which would bring the administration of 
justice into disrepute”.61 
The question of privilege was practically important in the context of Harkat because of a 
series of revelations concerning ministerial malfeasance. Since 2005, the Federal Court has 
required the ministers to disclose to the court all relevant information regarding the credibility 
and reliability of human sources, including the source’s motivation, evaluation, payment and 
background.62 Following Charkaoui II, this information would of course also be disclosed to 
SAs. In 2009, the Ministers informed designated judge Noel J. that they did not disclose that a 
CSIS informant had failed a polygraph test in 2001.63 What is more, a CSIS employee had 
reworded the original report in 2008 to conceal this fact; whereas the original, 2001 report 
indicated that the source in question was untruthful “on all relevant questions”, a second, 
“quality control” assessment of the test provided in 2008 indicated that the source was truthful 
on half of the relevant questions, and that the answers to the other half should have been found 
inconclusive.  The official report disclosed to the Federal Court did not contain any account of 
this revision or the original results; the court only received the amended report. The employee in 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
55 R v Leipert, [1997] 1 SCR 281. 
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58 See also Royal Commission of Inquiry Concerning Certain Activities of the Royal Canadian Mounted Police, First 
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59 Harkat, supra note 56 at paras 25-31, 32-48; R v Treu, [1979] JQ No. 202 (QL); Ribic v Canada (Attorney 
General), 2003 FCA 246, [2005] 1 FCR 33 at para 6, and by the Ontario Court of Appeal in R v Ribic, 2008 ONCA 
790, 238 CCC (3d) 225; Regulation of Investigatory Powers Act, UK 2000, c 23, at para 29(5)(e); Part 4 of 
Executive Order 12356 [3 CFR 66 (1982)] Sec. 4.1 General Restrictions on Access. 
60 Harkat, supra note 56 at paras 25-31. 
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question did not make mention of this post-facto change when the designated judge asked 
whether there was “anything unusual in the file relating to the human sources”.64  
Noel J. considered this incident a “troubling” and “flagrant” violation of procedural 
justice that impugned the integrity of the court.65 He lifted informer privilege, ordering the 
disclosure of information about the human source to the court and SAs, including information 
that might have revealed his/her identity.66 He later ordered the disclosure of similar information 
on another human source.67 Finally, he chose to rely on information provided by the human 
source in question only when corroborated by extrinsic evidence.68 It was in context of this 
breach of justice that SAs representing Mr. Harkat requested that all information relating to the 
human source be excluded or, in the alternative, that they be authorized to cross-examine the 
source. 
The Court reviewed Noel J.’s decision on these matters in Harkat. On the question of 
privilege, it decided that the functions of CSIS and police forces are sufficiently distinct as to 
preclude “automatically applying traditional police informer privilege to CSIS human sources”.69 
As noted by the Federal Court of Appeal both in Harkat and in Canada (AG) v. Almalki,70 class 
privilege is a fairly rare and inflexible protection which does not easily fit the realities of security 
intelligence work. In contrast to that inhering between police and informers, relationships 
between CSIS employees and human sources tend to be comparatively fluid, complex, and 
informal. Due to the categorical, all-or-nothing nature of class privilege, and the unique 
institutional and social contexts of security intelligence work, the question of informer privilege 
would best be left to Parliament rather than to courts.71 Parliament has since amended the CSIS 
Act to prohibit the disclosure of the identities of CSIS human sources, or information form which 
identity may be inferred, in any legal proceeding, including certificate proceedings. However, a 
named person or SA may contest that the person concerned is a human source, or, that certain 
information may not safely be disclosed. 
It remains to be seen whether this amendment will withstand Charter scrutiny. It is worth 
noting here that the Court in Harkat stated that disclosure of information pertaining to human 
sources would be only to persons with security-clearance and who are obligated to maintain the 
confidentiality of the information.72 On the one hand, this is not likely to inhibit the ability of 
CSIS to recruit new sources or to otherwise use traditional techniques for acquiring and 
processing information. On the other, it helps SAs and judges assess the reliability of evidence, 
most especially in light of above-noted instances of misdirection. The rights of named persons 
may be dependent on the disclosure of human source files and related information to SAs. It 
should also be noted that designated judges take into account the fact that information from 
human sources is hearsay when weighing the evidence.73 
There remained two outstanding issues: a) whether the destruction of important source 
materials – including recordings of intercepted communications used to link Mr. Harkat with 
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known terrorists-- rendered the proceedings against Mr. Harkat unfair, and b) whether the 
Ministers failed to discharge their duties of candour and utmost good faith in failing to secure 
recent foreign intelligence relevant to Mr. Harkat’s defence.  
 Pursuant to precedent established in the context of criminal law, the Minsters have a duty 
to retain evidence relevant to the defence of the named person and to explain the loss or 
destruction of such evidence; the failure to do so results in a Charter breach.74 Given the law 
established in Charkaoui II, the destruction of source files by CSIS constituted “unacceptable 
negligence” amounting to a breach of the Ministers’ disclosure obligations. Since this breach 
prejudiced Mr. Harkat’s ability to make full answer and defence, it amounted to a violation of his 
s. 7 right  to procedural fairness75 This breach does not, however, entail the right to a remedy – 
not even in the criminal law context. The provision of a remedy is a question to be determined on 
a case-by-case basis. Courts will here consider the nature and extent of the prejudice suffered,76 
“the context of the rest of the evidence and the position taken by the defence”.77  
Mr. Harkat sought one of two remedies: a stay of proceedings, or, an order excluding the 
summaries of the information contained in the destroyed files. The former remedy was refused. 
The request for the latter remedy received differing responses from the Federal Court, the 
Federal Court of Appeal, and the Supreme Court. In principle, the exclusion of evidence 
addresses any prejudice to the claimant to the extent necessary to preserve the integrity of the 
justice system. Since evidence may help courts perform their “truth-seeking” function despite 
producing prejudicial effects, alternatives to exclusion are to be preferred.78 The Federal Court 
refused to exclude the evidence on the grounds that summaries of the original operational notes 
and recordings were reliable, and hence the prejudice was minimal while the probative value was 
high. The Federal Court of Appeal excluded the summaries, noting that the reliability of the 
summaries could not be adequately tested and that the extent of the prejudice against Mr. Harkat 
was therefore unknown.79 
 The Supreme Court sided with the Federal Court on this issue. Not fully addressing the 
concerns of the Federal Court of Appeal, it declared the summaries to be reliable. It also noted 
admission of the summaries would not adversely affect the integrity of the justice system, as the 
destruction of the originals occurred prior to Charkaoui II, pursuant to policies that had not yet 
been declared unconstitutional. The destruction of the originals was, in other words, inadvertent 
and understandable given the uncertainty of the law at the time.  
One wonders how the Court knew that the summaries were reliable without comparing 
them with the originals. Presumably, the designated judge was able to corroborate the summaries 
by reference to closed material, but questions of Ministerial compliance with its disclosure 
obligations, both prior to and following Charkaoui II, raise serious doubts about the 
effectiveness of this method. It is likely that the courts placed great weight on the good faith of 
CSIS employees to, inter alia, accurately transcribe intercepted communications. The designated 
judge would have carefully assessed the trustworthiness of relevant employees responsible for 
the summaries when they were (cross-)examined during closed hearings.  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
74 R v La, [1997] 2 SCR 680 at paras 18-20. 
75 Harkat, supra note 12 at para 93. 
76 Charkaoui II, supra note 11 at para 46. 
77 R v J.G.B., [2001] 139 OAC 341 at para 38. 
78 R v Bjelland, 2009 SCC 38, [2009] 2 SCR 651, at para 3. 
79 Harkat, supra note 71 at para. 83. 
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Courts have adopted similarly deferential stances towards the Ministers and CSIS 
employees in other certificate cases. In the case of Hassan Almrei, for example, Mosely J. found 
that the destruction of primary source material (in this case, electronic surveillance) did not 
prejudice Mr. Almrei, as public summaries kept him reasonably informed.80 It bears mentioning, 
though, that signals intelligence did not form a prominent part of the Minsters’ case against Mr. 
Almrei.81 It also bears mentioning that Mosley J. admonished the Minsters for a breach of candor 
for failing to include in their SIR information that weakened or contradicted their case. To make 
matters worse, they seem to have all but halted their investigation of Mr. Almrei after 2001, in 
the belief that they did not need to consider it necessary to routinely update their knowledge of 
Mr. Almrei and the risk he posed to Canada. These failings were so severe that it resulted in a 
finding that the certificate against Mr. Almrei was unreasonable.82    
This brings us to the last issue. Mr. Harkat argued that the Minsters failed to secure from 
foreign intelligence agencies relevant information regarding the terrorists with whom he 
allegedly associated. This information could have been used to identify weaknesses in the 
summaries and closed evidence, as well as provide a more up-to-date picture of the threat 
environment, Islamic extremism and the Bin Laden Network. All of this could have had a 
bearing on the reasonableness of the certificate, at least by providing a fuller picture of whether 
Mr. Harkat currently poses a threat to the security of Canada. Unsurprisingly, the foreign 
intelligence agencies concerned refused the formal requests of the Ministers.83 The Court did not 
find a breach of candor and good faith because, unlike in Almrei, the Ministers made a 
reasonable effort to acquire this information and, what is more, they have “no general obligation 
to provide disclosure of evidence or information that is beyond their control”.84 
 
C. Summary 
In sum, Harkat seems to have resulted in the constitutionalization of the certificate 
regime. The legislative framework, including new provisions governing SAs, has survived a 
“second look”,85 and the evolving practices of the Federal Court have largely aligned with the 
principles elucidated in Charkaoui I and II. While the IRPA provides for the possibility of an 
unfair process, this alone does not render it unconstitutional -- what matters is the manner in 
which it is interpreted and applied. The Court directed designated (and appellate) judges to tend 
to the constitutionality of certificate proceedings on a case-by-case basis, using Charter 
principles, the language of the IRPA, and the evolving practices of the Federal Court. Also at 
issue -- although far less prominently-- were the extents to which the Ministers and CSIS have 
complied with their statutory and constitutional obligations. Importantly, the Court did not 
seriously review executive practices or policies, focusing instead on the performance of legal 
institutions. Its concern was primarily with encouraging and facilitating the comprehensive and 
coherent application of internal norms by designated judges in order to better constrain the 
actuality of executive decision-making.  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
80 Almrei, supra note 42 at para. 491. 
81 Ibid at para. 491. 
82 Ibid at paras. 504-509. 
83 For a copy of the letters of request sent, see: Harkat (Re), 2010 FC 1243, Annex “A”, at paras 6-7. 
84 Harkat, supra note 12 at para 103. 
85– Kent Roach, “Sharpening the Dialogue Debate: The Next Decade of Scholarship” (2007) 45:1 Osgoode Hall LJ 
169; Peter W. Hogg, Allison A. Bushell Thorton, & Wade K. Wright, “Charter Dialogue Revisited: Or ‘Much Ado 
About Metaphors’” (2007) 45:1 Osgoode Hall LJ 1.  
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   Designated judges have accordingly faced a steep learning curve. Amidst a shifting 
constitutional and legislative landscape, they seem to have produced a fairly consistent body of 
law concerning the interpretation and application of the IRPA as well as the extents to which 
criminal law principles apply to certificate proceedings. The evolving practices of the Federal 
Court have remained subject to appeal and, in some instances, have been transformed into 
binding law through the Supreme Court’s judgments in Charkaoui I, Charkaoui II and Harkat. In 
fact, the Court’s judgments in these cases have served both as a framework for the production of 
new practices (such as with disclosure following Charkaoui II), and a means of clarifying and 
refining resultant jurisprudence.  
   
 
IV. Truly Exceptional? Harkat, Suresh and Deportation to Torture  
 
The constitutionalization of certificates sits uneasily alongside their supposed status as 
“exceptional” measures. A highly contested concept, exceptionality may be loosely defined as a 
state in which a sovereign asserts power that transcends the rule of law. Exceptional measures 
are on this reading those that cannot be justified by reference to constitutional principles or 
autonomous legal values, including the rule of law. Power is justified politically by reference to a 
real or fictitious emergency that threatens the existence of a political community.86But it may 
also be justified by means of invalid, unsound, or insincere interpretations of pre-existing legal 
norms.87 In this latter instance, the executive (and possibly the legislative and executive branch) 
uses the form of law to rationalize injustice, while the substance of law remains absent.88 
We should be quite ambivalent about the way the Supreme Court has reviewed the 
constitutionality of the certificate regime. On the one hand, Charkaoui I and II have resulted in 
meaningful improvements to procedural rights, including the provision of SAs and enhanced 
disclosure. In Harkat, the Court improved the capacity of SAs to represent named persons by 
directing designated judges to be liberal in the granting of communication requests, to safeguard 
solicitor-client privilege, to ensure the provision of a minimum core of disclosure, and to be 
vigilant against over-claiming of national security confidentiality. Coupled with enhanced 
disclosure pursuant to Charkaoui II, these changes have been meaningful. The permissibility of 
communication between SAs and named persons, for example, has helped SAs directly refute the 
veracity of the Minster’s allegations and supporting evidence, rather than to simply challenge 
what inferences may be reasonably drawn from the evidentiary record;89 the accuracy or 
correctness of evidence is as important as -- if not more so-- whether conclusions drawn from the 
evidence are reasonable. Vigilance against over-claiming of confidentiality has also had 
powerful impacts, as evidenced by the quashing of the certificate against Messrs. Charkaoui90 
and Almrei.91  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
86 Gross, supra note 9; Carl Schmitt, Political Theology: Four Chapters on the Concept of Sovereignty [trans. G. Schwab] 
(Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1985) pp 5-6. 
87 Benjamin, supra note 9; Agamben, supra note 9.  
88 Dyzenhaus, supra note 9 at 72; Agamben, supra note 9 at chapter 2 “Force of Law without Law” 
89 For an example where SA system is better here than UK see: Amnesty International, Left in the Dark: The use of 
Secret Evidence in the United Kingdom (London UK: Amnesty International Publications, 2012), online: 
http://www.refworld.org/pdfid/50bdbb6b2.pdf at p. 11  
90 Charkaoui (re), supra note 41. 
91 Almrei, supra note 42. 
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On the other hand, there remain outstanding procedural issues. SAs remain at a 
disadvantage, lacking the same levels of professional and administrative support available to 
government lawyers. Whereas the latter may confer with each other on cases and legal strategies, 
the former work alone, balancing their roles as SA with private practice. Prohibitions on 
communication between SAs and named persons can adversely affect legal representation when 
one’s legal strategy depends on the content of classified material – a problem again not faced by 
government lawyers.  
Less discussed are a host of outstanding substantive issues, including the protracted 
detentions, harm to dignity, and the risk of deportation to torture. In Charkaoui I, the Court 
provided a short, doctrinally flat decision on the question of discrimination,92 but provided some 
guidance on the length of time for which named persons may be detained.93 Following Harkat, 
and the beginning phases of his removal, the question of deportation to torture is the elephant in 
the room. Suresh ostensibly settled this issue in 2002, when the Court held that it is “generally” 
unconstitutional to deport someone to face the substantial risk of torture. However, it also 
decided that deportation to torture would be permitted under “exceptional circumstances”.94 This 
is to say that there is a presumption against deportation to torture, which the government may 
rebut if it demonstrates evidence of a “serious threat to national security”. The Court specified 
that: 
A person constitutes a “danger to the security of Canada” if he or she poses a 
serious threat to the security of Canada, whether direct or indirect, and bearing in 
mind the fact that the security of one country is often dependent on the security of 
other nations.  The threat must be “serious”, in the sense that it must be grounded 
on objectively reasonable suspicion based on evidence and in the sense that the 
threatened harm must be substantial rather than negligible. 95 
The Court was clear that determinations of risk are fact-based, political, and entitled to 
deference: if “the Minister is able to show evidence that reasonably supports a finding of danger 
to the security of Canada, courts should not interfere with the Minister’s decision.”96 Decisions 
concerning the risk a person poses as well as whether the person may be safely removed from 
Canada are findings of fact reviewable on a standard of patent unreasonabless. The Court did not 
clarify what counts as an “exceptional circumstance”, stating only that “the ambit of an 
exceptional discretion to deport to torture, if any, must await future cases”.97 
I do not want to tread too heavily into thorny, theoretical debates about the exceptionality 
of certificates or deportation to torture. Instead, I would like to take a moment and reflect on the 
relationship between Harkat and Suresh, both in terms of what we may expect regarding the 
possible removal of Mr. Harkat and, more generally, the intersection of procedural and 
substantive justice in the context of security-based deportation proceedings. 
 
A. Beyond Certificates: The (non-)Impact of Constitutional Principles on Adjudicative 
and Discretionary Decision-Making 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
92 Charkaoui I, supra note 10 at paras 129-132. 
93 The Court held that lengthy “extended periods of detention under the certificate provisions of the IRPA do not 
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detention, taking into account all relevant factors”, including the anticipated length of detention” (Ibid at para 110). 
94 Suresh, supra note 14 at para 78. 
95 Ibid at para 90. 
96 Ibid at para 85. 
97 Ibid at para 78. 
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One of the principles elucidated with equal force in Suresh and the certificate trilogy -- as 
well as the foundational case of Singh v Canada (Minister of Employment and Immigration)98 -- 
is that the greater the risk of substantive injustice associated with a decision, the greater should 
be the procedural protections to which affected persons are entitled. More than this, there should 
be a reliable system for ensuring that authoritative decision-makers interpret and apply enabling 
statutory provisions and regulations in a manner that consists with constitutional principles. 
According to the Supreme Court in the certificate trilogy, this vigilance is the condition under 
which it will tolerate provisions and practices that provide for the possibility of grave injustice. 
The “administrative” nature of a decision does not justify inadequate procedural protections 
before removing of persons to face human rights abuses abroad. 
The certificate trilogy illustrates that the actualization of this principle depends on deep 
institutional commitment and broad-based internalization of constitutional norms by relevant 
actors. Unfortunately, those who make decisions about deportation to torture lack this 
commitment and supporting institutional architecture. Consider the process by which security 
risks are removed from Canada when there is a question of torture or similar abuse. The first 
stage in this process involves a finding of inadmissibility, which can occur in various ways. It 
may occur once a certificate has been found to be reasonable. Far more often, it occurs following 
an admissibility hearing, a refugee claim hearing, or a finding of inadmissibility by a Minster’s 
Delegate (MD) in the absence of an oral hearing altogether.99 The Minister is always represented 
in admissibility hearings, and may intervene in refugee claim hearings for reasons that include 
national security. When there is an issue of, inter alia, national security, s. 86 of the IRPA states 
that: 
The Minister may, during an admissibility hearing, a detention review or an 
appeal before the Immigration Appeal Division, apply for the non-disclosure of 
information or other evidence. Sections 83 and 85.1 to 85.5 apply to the 
proceeding with any necessary modifications, including that a reference to 
“judge” be read as a reference to the applicable Division of the Board.  
This provision ensures that ordinary proceedings presided over by an IRB member are 
conducted expeditiously, informally, and with precisely the same legislative rules regarding the 
admissibility of evidence and the non-disclosure of classified material as used in certificate 
cases. They become, in other words, functional equivalents to certificate proceedings. 
Once an applicant has been deemed to be inadmissible, they are subject to the second 
stage of removal. In most cases, an immigration official (IO) will conduct a Pre-Removal Risk 
Assessment (PRRA) and determine whether an applicant is at risk of persecution, torture or 
similar abuse.100 IOs will look at both the general human rights record of their country of origin 
and whether the claimant faces a particularized, personal risk. If the IO determines that there is a 
risk of persecution or torture, the third step involves the filing of a threat assessment by an 
analyst in the National Security Division of the Intelligence Directorate, Canada Border Services 
Agency. These two reports are then sent to a MD, while a (redacted) copy is sent to the 
applicant. If the MD agrees with the report, s/he will balance the danger the applicant poses to 
Canadian security with the risk of torture s/he faces if deported. In situations where there is a 
substantial risk of torture, the MD will issue a “danger opinion” pursuant to s. 115(2) of the 
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IRPA, thereby invoking the Suresh exception. There is no right to an oral hearing concerning the 
issuance of a danger opinion, but affected persons are entitled to receive and submit written 
challenges against the information upon which the decision is made (excluding that protected by 
national security confidentiality). S/he is also entitled to the reasons for the decision.101  
 We may usefully distinguish this process into two types. The first would be adjudicative 
in nature, and would include certificate proceedings, admissibility hearings, detention reviews, 
and judicial reviews. Notice that these hearings relate to the labeling of persons as security 
threats, are presided over by independent and impartial adjudicators, and are both adversarial and 
oral. The second would be discretionary, in which the Minister or her delegate makes a decision 
independently of an oral, adversarial hearing. Discretionary decisions relate to a range of subject 
matter, but for our purposes it is important to note that they are decisions to remove persons who 
have been successfully labeled as security threats. This means that final decisions about whether 
there is a substantial risk of torture or similar abuse is a discretionary decision – albeit one that is 
notionally (though in many cases, not practically) subject to judicial review. It turns out that the 
principles of the certificate trilogy seem to have had positive impacts on adjudicative decisions to 
label someone a security threat, while Suresh has had little to no impact on subsequent 
discretionary decisions to remove such persons in the context of torture or similar abuse. 
 Section 86, for instance, ensures that proceedings before the IRB are subject to relevant 
provisions of Division 9 of the IRPA, even if the hearing is not, strictly speaking, a certificate 
proceeding. As part of this process, IRB adjudicators are authorized (and obligated) to appoint a 
SA.102 Importantly, IRB members who preside over such hearings receive comprehensive 
training in secret evidence and national security law, while all secret hearings before the IRB 
involve a SA. Similarly, s. 87.1 of the IRPA authorizes Federal Court judges to appoint SAs 
during judicial reviews that include secret evidence. This may occur during reviews of IRB 
decisions, or, Ministerial decisions that rested in part on sensitive information. Presumably, SAs 
are appointed when secret evidence forms an important component of the decision under review. 
Yet, there have been some cases where the Federal Court has refused to appoint a SA. In the 
2007 case of Segasayo v. Canada, for instance, Blais J. held that the provision of SAs during the 
review of a Ministerial decision to deny an exemption was inappropriate.103 He reasoned, first, 
that “only those subject to a security certificate face detention while awaiting a decision on their 
inadmissibility”.104  Second, the extent of closed evidence in the case was much smaller than a 
certificate hearing. 105 Finally, whereas the Court in Charkaoui I was concerned about 
deportation to torture, those not named in certificates are less likely to face that risk because they 
may still claim protection, either as a refugee or a person in need of protection.106  Similarly, the 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
101 Suresh, supra note 14.   
102 Parliament elected to provide for the appointment of SAs before IRB members, even though the constitutionality 
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Federal Court refused to appoint a SA in Kanyamibwa v Canada107,	  noting that the claimant in 
this case was not at risk of torture or similar human rights abuses.	   
I would cautiously say that the certificate trilogy has influenced adjudicative proceedings 
outside the context of certificates per se. There may well be a process of acculturation within the 
IRB that mirrors that which has occurred within the Federal Court. However, the rationale of the 
Federal Court in refusing to appoint a SA during judicial reviews highlight some persistent and 
dangerous assumptions about the substantive injustices faced by persons deemed inadmissible on 
security grounds – even if the decision was right on the facts of a particular case. First, it is 
untrue that only persons named in certificates are detained pending determinations of 
admissibility. In point of fact, the CBSA regularly detains asylum seekers alongside those whose 
refugee claims have been rejected.108 Problems with record keeping have prevented the isolation 
of the precise number of asylum seekers who have been detained (as well as for how long and on 
what grounds), as the CBSA classifies asylum seekers and persons whose claims have been 
rejected under the same category.109 Nonetheless, Canada has been subject of a number of 
international criticisms for increasing its detention of asylum seekers, as well as for using 
provincial or municipal prisons for this purpose110 What is most relevant for our purposes is that 
detention inhibits the capacity of asylum seekers to make successful claims for protection, owing 
to such factors as lack of access to counsel, family abroad, the internet, supporting information, 
and important documents.111 
New measures allow for the automatic and mandatory 12 month detention of groups of 
persons whom the Minster deems to be “irregular arrivals” – a category intended to apply to 
groups of persons believed to have arrived through human smuggling/trafficking routes and who 
cannot be examined or investigated in a timely manner.112 Section 55 of the IRPA authorizes the 
detention of non-citizens whom an officer has reasonable grounds to believe is inadmissible and 
a danger to the public or a flight risk. Foreign nationals may be arrested and detained without 
warrant, while permanent residents may simply be detained without a warrant. Detentions are 
reviewed regularly,113 although as noted the continuation of detention may be ordered on the 
basis of closed material. What is more, continued detentions must be allowed if the CBSA is still 
conducting an investigation, even if the grounds of the investigation do not relate to the initial 
reasons for the detention.114 This provision has been used more frequently in recent years, 
specifically in relation to irregular migrants arriving by boat.115 Finally, the government has 
prolonged detentions by vigorously challenging decisions to release affected persons. The 
detention continues until the challenge is finally resolved, resulting in prolonged, if not 
indefinite, detention. 116 
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The Federal Court may have also underestimated the extent to which national security 
and other priorities related to risk management have affected the examination and investigation 
of irregular migrants. Two agencies are involved here: CSIS and the Canadian Border Services 
Agency (CBSA). CSIS is, of course, the primary source of intelligence in certificate cases, but it 
may also investigate any applicant who poses a threat to national security.117 In fact, most files 
are handled by the CBSA, which has grown considerably in size and sophistication since it was 
established in 2003. The CBSA is authorized to examine and investigate all applicants who may 
be inadmissible on, among other things, security grounds. In these cases, CBSA officers rely on 
the Security Intelligence Section (SIS) of the Intelligence Operations and Analysis Division of 
the CBSA for intelligence and other information.118 Officers also receive assistance from the 
National Security Screening Division (NSSD) of the International Operations Directorate of the 
CBSA, if foreign intelligence or information is needed. 119 The SIS and NSSD conduct 
independent security intelligence and information gathering, risk assessments and 
investigations,120 using human sources (including confidential informants),121 signals 
intelligence122 and foreign intelligence. The CBSA is also legislatively authorized to participate 
in bilateral correspondences and information-sharing with agencies operating within an 
applicants’ country of origin.123 
In recent years, the CBSA has increasingly focused on the intersection of criminality and 
(irregular) migration, employing technologies and practices similar to those used by police 
services.124 It has a Criminal Investigations Division and partners with domestic and foreign 
police services through “Joint Force Operations”.125 The CBSA thus engages in both security 
intelligence and law-enforcement activities, but in this case, both functions are housed within the 
same agency. This mirrors the blurring of the roles and responsibilities of CSIS and the RCMP, 
and is reminiscent of pre-CSIS years when security intelligence was collected by the RCMP. It 
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should be recalled that the rights impacts associated with this blurring motivated the Supreme 
Court to impose upon CSIS standards of disclosure normally applicable to police agencies in 
Charkaoui II. It should also be noted that a foundational principle of national security since the 
MacDonald Commission is that security intelligence and policing be kept separate. 126 
Importantly, the CBSA is not yet subject to independent review, nor has there been significant 
Charter review of its activities. 127  
Thus, “ordinary” proceedings and certificate proceedings rest on the same substratum of 
executive practices regarding detention and intelligence-gathering and –sharing. As in the 
certificate context, these practices can lead to arrest, detention, prosecution, and possibly grave 
human rights abuse following removal.  Following the arrival of the MV Sun Sea, for example, 
Canada removed Sathyapavan "Sathi" Aseervatham on the basis of past criminality and his 
involvement in organizing the Sun Sea’s voyage. There are reports that Sathi was immediately 
detained by Sri Lankan authorities upon his arrival and subsequently tortured.128 Given that 
refugee determination hearings are private, it is unclear how Sri Lankan authorities knew of the 
timing of his arrival or why they suspected him of being linked to terrorist organizations. It has 
been suggested that the CBSA shared identity documents with Sri Lankan authorities, possibly in 
order to complete its investigations.129 Although it clearly puts asylum seekers at risk, the 
Federal Court has on several occasions allowed the practice.130 
 This brings us to common presumptions about the nature and frequency of deportations 
to torture or similar abuse. Blais J. asserted that those named in certificates are more likely than 
others to face this risk. It turns out this is not true: persons named in certificates have in fact been 
comparatively less likely to face this risk. In Mahjoub v. Canada,131 Dawson J. held that a danger 
opinion issued against Mr. Mahjoub was unreasonable, on the grounds that there was an 
inadequate factual foundation for the assertion that he posed a danger to the security of Canada. 
The MD in question relied only on the narratives contained in the Minster’s SIR, and the fact that 
the certificate issued against Mr. Mahjoub had been found to be reasonable in 2001. She was not, 
however, provided with confidential reference appendices that would have placed the narrative 
in fuller context and provided more up-to-date information regarding the danger Mr. Mahjoub 
posed to Canada after having been publically labeled a terrorist and detained for years. The court 
noted that, while one’s past activities may render them inadmissible: 
“the effect of the passage of time, and the effect of the person's apprehension and detention, 
should be considered so that … their future behaviour may be assessed. It may be, for example, 
that the fact of apprehension and disclosure of a person's associations or activities will neutralize 
their future ability to conduct clandestine activities”.132  
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A similar ruling was made in the case of Jaballah133 and Almrei.134  
Subsequent cases involving Mr. Mahjoub have dealt more squarely with the substantive 
issue of deportation to torture.  After reconsidering the file in light of a fuller factual record that 
included closed material, a MD again concluded that Mr. Mahjoub posed a threat to Canadian 
security, and that he could be safely removed from Canada. In 2007, Tremblay-Lamer J. upheld 
the former determination, but quashed the decision on the grounds that it was unreasonable to 
conclude that Mr. Mahjoub would not face a substantial risk of torture if deported. The onus of 
proving a risk of torture is on the claimant, who must provide evidence concerning the human 
rights record of the home state as well as a personalized risk i.e. a risk that is greater than that of 
the general population.  Trembaly-Lamer J. found that the MD had “selectively relied on 
information that went against the bulk of the evidence in concluding there was no 
institutionalized torture in Egypt” and arbitrarily rejected “important, credible evidence on this 
issue”.135 A similar judgment was made in the case of Mr. Almrei.136  
All other instances of deportation to torture have occurred outside the context of 
certificates. The case of Sogi v. Canada is an especially good example. Immigration officials 
decided in 2003 and in 2005 that Mr. Bachan Singh Sogi (who had previously been deemed 
inadmissible for reasons relating to national security) would face a substantial risk of torture 
should he be returned to India.137 The MD issued a danger opinion, asserting that Mr. Sogi could 
nonetheless be deported pursuant to the Suresh exception. The Federal Court quashed the danger 
opinion on grounds unrelated to the justifications offered in support of deportation to torture.138 
The government subsequently reassessed the risk and, in 2006, a MD decided that Mr. Sogi 
could now be safely removed. The Federal Court refused to grant a stay of removal pending a 
review of the reasonableness of this decision. 139  During this process, the UN CAT twice 
requested that Canada stay removal until it had time to issue its own decision on the case. 
Canada ignored these requests and deported Mr. Sogi anyway. Shortly thereafter, the UN CAT 
issued an advisory opinion that there was in fact a substantial risk of torture. It has been reported 
that Mr. Sogi was “imprisoned, beaten and subjected to ill-treatment” after his removal.140 
In Dadar v. Canada,141a MD decided that the claimant would not face a substantial risk 
of torture if returned to Iran. The claimant applied to the UNCAT, which found that he did in fact 
face a substantial risk of torture.142 The Federal Court refused to intervene or to grant a stay of 
proceedings in light of the CAT’s views.143In 2011, the UN CAT again found that the decision of 
a MD was erroneous, this time in the case of Somali national Jama Warsam. 144 In 2007, an 
immigration officer had found that Mr. Warsam would face a substantial risk of torture if 
returned to Somalia, in part because of wide-spread and systematic human rights abuses. There 
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was a personalized risk as Mr. Warsame had never been to Somalia (he was born in Egypt and 
had lived in Canada since the age of 4), did not speak local languages, and had no resources upon 
which to rely for safety.  Subsequently, a MD decided that there was in fact no personalized risk. 
Importantly, Mr. Warsam could not have the decision of the MD judicially reviewed because he 
lacked the financial capacity to hire a lawyer.145 He was fortunate enough to have secured 
refugee status while in transit in the Netherlands, raising questions about the correctness (if not 
the good faith) of the MD’s determination.146 
In Muhammad v. Canada (Citizenship and Immigration)147, there was a serious issue of 
political interference with respect to a MD’s finding that the claimant, Arshad Muhammad, was 
not at risk of torture if returned to Pakistan. The claimant had initially been denied refugee status 
in 2003 due to his membership in a terrorist organization. He fled, spending the next 8 years in 
hiding. In 2011, he was apprehended after his name and picture had been posted on the CBSA’s 
“Most Wanted” website. An IO prepared a PRRA assessment and concluded that Muhammad 
faced a personal risk of torture due to the fact that the allegations against him were widely 
publicized and likely known by Pakistani authorities.148 The claimant argued before the Federal 
Court that the MD’s decision was unreasonable, owing in part to political interference. Among 
the noted irregularities was a highly unusual meeting between the MD and the Director General 
of Border Operations of CBSA, Glenda Lavergne, before the MD had rendered her decision. 
Court-ordered disclosure of correspondences revealed that Lavergne had expressed concern that 
a positive finding would affect the reputation and viability of the most wanted list.149  The Court 
found that the MD’s decision to ignore the PRRA assessment was unreasonable because it was 
unsupported by the factual record. It also ruled, however, that there was no reasonable 
apprehension of bias and that there was insufficient evidence of lack of independence and 
impartiality.150   
These cases highlight a serious lack of consistency and, frankly, independence in the 
decisions of IOs and MDs. In some situations, persons have been recognized by IOs to be in 
need of protection, only to have MDs make the opposite finding under highly politicized 
circumstances. Consistency is hampered by a host of institutional barriers pervasive within 
immigration and refugee law, including: the financial inability of most refugee claimants to hire 
lawyers,151 the elimination or reduction of rights to appeal, expedited refugee claim hearings, the 
use of Designated Countries of Origin criteria, the refusal of the Federal Court to order stays of 
removal pending reviews of Ministerial decisions, and inconsistent Federal Court decisions on 
the certification of applications for judicial review of such decisions.152Another difficulty is that 
claimants must adduce evidence both of the general human rights record of their country of 
origin and a particularized, personal risk. Since decisions of the MD on questions of fact are 
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reviewable only on a standard of patent unreasonableness, it is quite possible for there to be 
incorrect but reasonable decisions concerning the risk of torture. 
All of this is to say that certificates are just one component of a far broader set of 
measures by which the state investigates, detains, and deports non-citizens deemed to be security 
risks. Together with certificates, rather ordinary measures that have long been a part of our 
immigration and refugee law framework form part of an alternate legal order organized around 
an interconnected set of legislative provisions and executive practices highly attuned to security. 
While cases such as Charkaoui I and II, Harkat, and Suresh establish constitutional boundaries 
to security-based detention and deportation practices, the institutional framework necessary for 
minimal adherence to the rule of law seem to have been strenuously applied only to the most 
conspicuous part of this alternate order: certificates. The usual justification for this (i.e. that 
certificates are an exceptional case) is unpersuasive, as the risk of deportation to serious human 
rights abuse is actually higher for those whose removal begins through ordinary processes than 
for those named in certificates.  
 
B. Where to From Here? Revisiting Suresh 
Some of these issues may be resolved by revisiting Suresh. The likelihood of this is 
uncertain, as some Federal Court judges have been reluctant to seriously engage with the 
question of torture abroad, on the dubious grounds that these are extra-territorial matters and 
hence beyond the reach of the Charter.153With a fuller factual record of the intersection of 
security, migration and torture post-9/11, the emergence of new domestic and international 
norms, a less heightened sense of emergency, and the best practices of foreign jurisdictions at its 
disposal, 154  the Supreme Court would be quite justified in finding that principles of fundamental 
justice have developed to such a degree that deportation to torture is no longer permissible under 
any circumstance. 155 What would this mean?  
One answer is that Canada would explore the feasibility of seeking “diplomatic 
assurances” against torture, much as it does with respect to extradition to countries that impose 
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capital punishment. The Court said very little about the adequacy of assurances. International 
perspectives shed light on this issue. In Othman (Abu Qatada) v. the United Kingdom,156 the UK 
tested the tolerance of the ECtHR for assurances. The ECtHR held that there are circumstances 
in which assurances reduce the personalized risk of torture to the point that deportation is legally 
permissible. This applies even when the state that provides the assurance engages in systematic, 
widespread torture.157 The strength of assurances must be assessed in consideration of the 
following factors:  
(i) whether the terms of the assurances have been disclosed to the Court  
(ii) whether the assurances are specific or are general and vague  
(iii)      who has given the assurances and whether that person can bind the receiving State  
(iii) if the assurances have been issued by the central government of the receiving State,  
whether local authorities can be expected to abide by them  
(iv) whether the assurances concerns treatment which is legal or illegal in the  
receiving State  
      (vii)     the length and strength of bilateral relations between the sending and receiving States,         
      including the receiving State’s record in abiding by similar assurances  
      (viii)    whether compliance with the assurances can be objectively verified through   
                 diplomatic or other monitoring mechanisms, including providing unfettered access to  
                 the applicant’s lawyers  
      (ix)     whether there is an effective system of protection against torture in the receiving State,     
                 including whether it is willing to cooperate with international monitoring mechanisms  
                (including international human rights NGOs), and whether it is willing to investigate  
                 allegations of torture and to punish those responsible  
          (x)       whether the applicant has previously been ill-treated in the receiving State  
          (xi)      whether the reliability of the assurances has been examined by the domestic courts              
                      of the sending/Contracting State.158 
 
While in this case the assurances were complied with, many view assurances as 
inherently unreliable.159 There is no shortage of cases where countries have not abided by their 
promises to respect human rights. In Agiza v. Sweden,160 Sweden was found to be in 
contravention of international law when it deported Ahmed Agiza to Egypt on the strength of an 
assurance against torture. Once returned, Agiza was subject to beatings and electronic shocks. 
The most relevant example would, of course, be that of Maher Arar, who was subject to torture 
after he was “returned” to Syria by the US on the basis of an assurance against torture.  
In my view, the most valuable approach would be to improve the institutional 
architecture employed to examine asylum seekers, to ensure that decisions about risk of torture 
are based on law and the facts, and to provide more adequate mechanisms for the review of these 
decisions (and underlying intelligence practices). This could happen in various ways, including 
greater disclosure during security-based admissibility, detention review, and refugee claim 
hearings. There is some indication that the Federal Court is moving in this direction. In Seyoboka 
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v. Canada (Minister of Citizenship and Immigration),161 Montingy J. found that those facing 
allegations of international criminality and other serious charges in the context of adversarial 
IRB hearings are entitled to ”a high degree of procedural fairness” and expanded disclosure, 
pursuant to Charkaoui II. Relying on this case, Harrington J. found in B135 v. Canada 
(Citizenship and Immigration)162 that the Minster was obligated to disclose certain evidence to 
an IRB board member during a refugee claim hearing concerning a passenger of the Sun Sea. 
This evidence indicated that several passengers who had been returned to Sri Lanka were 
detained, beaten and subject to ill-treatment, and that the whereabouts of one passenger is 
unknown. 163  
International and foreign standards are also relevant to the processes by which MDs make 
decisions about the risk of torture, especially when decisions are based on material that cannot be 
disclosed to the affected person. The ECtHR and other international and foreign courts have 
recently ruled that asylum seekers do not have the right to access closed material upon which 
decision-makers rely when determining the risk of torture.164 However, this decision was 
predicated in part on the fact that the UK’s Special Immigration Appeals Commission (SIAC) 
makes final decisions about risk of torture after an oral hearing in which the interests of affected 
persons are represented by SAs. The SIAC – which is responsible for reviewing decisions of the 
UK Government with respect to detention and deportation-- is composed of a judge, a senior 
member of the Asylum & Immigration Tribunal, and a layperson with expertise in national 
security and independent adjudicators. The SA system adopted in Canada was modeled in large 
part after the SIAC system. Unlike in the UK, though, our SA system has been effectively 
confined to adjudicative proceedings and does not extend to Ministerial decisions about the risk 
of torture. We might consider employing something similar to the SIAC system in cases where 
deportation to torture intersects with national security or similar imperatives i.e. make decisions 
to deport in the context of torture less discretionary and more adjudicative. 
In the alternative, courts should reconsider the adoption of deferential stances towards the 
findings of MDs in the context of security. With respect, the Canadian government has lost trust 
on this issue, owing to its role in the torture of Maher Arar, Abdullah Almaki,	  Ahmad El Maati, 
Muayyed Nureddin,	  the human rights abuses perpetrated against Omar Khadr, the Afghan 
Detainee issue, and recently publicized documents concerning the CSIS stance on the 
permissibility of relying on torture for “actionable” intelligence.165 Matters have not been 
improved by disrespect for the roles and responsibilities of the UN CAT. In three cases Canada 
deported persons despite the fact that the UN CAT found there to be a substantial risk of torture. 
In one case, the affected person was deported notwithstanding this finding, and in another the 
affected person was removed before the committee had concluded its deliberations. In this latter 
case, two requests for a temporary suspension of removal were ignored. It is true that the views if 
the UN CAT are not binding, but they may be viewed in some measure as findings of fact or, at 
least, bases for appraising the reasonableness of decisions of IOs and MDs. Insofar as there were 
substantial risks of torture in these cases, and no good reason provided as to why the Suresh 
exception applied, the removal of these men was arguably contrary to the Charter. 
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If viewed simply within the context of Division 9 of IRPA and Supreme Court 
judgments, the certificate regime may seem to be a rather unique system. It is perhaps on the 
basis of its putatively distinctive form as well as grave human rights implications that the 
Supreme Court thrice imposed stringent constitutional constraints on the decisions of those 
operating within this setting. Yet, certificates remain but one part of a larger of process by which 
migration in general -- and irregular migration in particular -- has been securitized. It is worth 
remembering here that Parliament transferred jurisdiction over certificate proceedings from 
SIRC to the Federal Court following an emergency parliamentary session that was convened to 
deal with the irregular arrival of 174 Sikh asylum seekers in 1987.166 In the late 1980’s and early 
1990’s, Parliament, CSIS, the Department of National Defence, and the Department of Foreign 
Affairs and International Trade all identified, for the first time, irregular migration as a distinct 
security threat, owing in part to the threats posed by terrorism.167  
Irregular migration – which may be defined as the process by which people enter or 
reside in a country without that country’s legal permission--168 has since risen high on Canada’s 
national security agenda. We have responded with “smarter” approaches to border control 
characterized by a number of themes, including greater emphasis on risk management, enhanced 
surveillance and screening of migrants,169 and greater information-sharing/institutional co-
operation at the domestic and international levels.170 Following the widely publicized arrivals of 
two boats of Tamil asylum seekers on Canadian shores in 2009 and 2010, organizational changes 
and capacities have been further influenced by legislation. Parliament has tightened restrictions 
on irregular migrants through a range of preventive and deterrent measures, such as: visa 
regimes, carrier sanctions, expedited refugee claim hearings, limitations on rights of appeal, 
Designated Country of Origin criteria, the criminalization of irregular entry, mandatory detention 
for groups of migrants classified as “irregular arrivals”, enhanced surveillance, and biometrics.171  
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Certificates are perhaps the most conspicuous, but far from the only, oldest, or most 
commonly used, of these measures. The disaggregation of certificates from this larger context is 
evident in how discussions about them have been structured by the grammar of constitutional 
rights and principles germane to criminal law. This has produced a rather unique institutional 
approach to managing the intersections among security, migration and asylum. Factors 
influencing the constitutionalization of certificates include concerted social and political 
mobilization, powerful legal advocacy, media awareness, and the internalization and 
operationalization of human rights norms by judges of the Federal Court, Federal Court of 
Appeal, and the Supreme Court. The authenticity and quality of this institutional experiment is 
open to question, but a strong case can be made that executive decision-making has been 
subjected to the rule of law. In any event, after Harkat, the current regime is likely to be as good 
as it gets.  
But the construction of this regime may have come at the cost of bracketing some 
important substantive justice issues, as well as how these issues are and are not handled by 
decision-makers in analogous institutional settings. At best, the certificate trilogy stands for the 
principle that named persons are entitled to heightened procedural fairness by virtue of the 
impact security-based detentions and deportations have on life, liberty, and security of the 
person. High on this list are the ways in which being labeled a terrorist heightens the risk of 
persecution, torture, and similar abuses among those who are returned to certain countries. What 
is hard to fathom is why one would think that this impact is unique to certificates, or that they it 
is any more tolerable when they arise pursuant to ordinary immigration and refugee law 
measures. Why have procedural safeguards been heightened in the former context, but not (and 
even reduced) in the latter?  
All throughout the certificate trilogy, the Court has stated that the applicability of Charter 
principles depends on the impacts that laws, policies and practices have on the integrity of 
affected persons, and not on how one formally classifies those laws e.g. as criminal, 
administrative. It was on the basis of subsequent analogies between certificates/security 
intelligence agencies and criminal proceedings/law-enforcement agencies that the Court applied 
principles germane to the latter in and to the former. Yet, the migration of human rights norms 
from criminal to certificate contexts has not been followed by the migration of rights from 
certificates to functionally connected or even equivalent proceedings. The reasons offered for 
this have typically involved formal, if not hierarchical distinctions between certificate and all 
other security-based detention and deportation proceedings. These distinctions rest on dubious 
assumptions about the nature and putatively lighter impacts the latter have on the rights of 
asylum seekers. Similarly, the practices of the CBSA have hitherto not received the same level of 
independent judicial or administrative review as CSIS in this context.  
It is for these reasons that one would do well to analyze Harkat, not just for what it says 
about the certificate regime, but for what it can and should say about other, neglected corners of 
the security/migration nexus. If the Court is serious that the very real risks of substantive 
injustice faced by named persons necessitates procedural safeguards at least as robust as those 
now used in certificate proceedings, and if (as the evidence shows) this risk is at least as great for 
those caught up in more ordinary proceedings, then it should make as a priority ensuring the 
more effective operationalization of the principles it laid down in Suresh. Absent movement in 
this area, the procedural gains made in the context of reviews of the reasonableness of 
certificates will be vastly outweighed by the continued existence of woefully inadequate 
procedures by which decisions about deportation to torture are made and reviewed. This will 
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only increase the sense among skeptics that the constitutionalization of the certificate regime 
uses the form of law to mask the emptying out of its substance.   
  
	  
